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and the court finding that notice of the hearing of said
petition has been given w ____________ as required by law;''
and ordering that respondent be appointed guardian "upon
his giving a
bond . . . , and taking and subscribing
the oath required by law.'' His oath was dated April 30,
1942. On the same day, respondent filed a verified petition,
in which he described himself as the ''duly appointed, qualified and acting guardian of the estate of the above named
minors,'' asking that an order be made permitting him as guardian to sell the property of the guardianship estate. His letters
of guardianship were not issued until five days later, May 5,
1942. Notice of hearing on the petition for permission to
sell ·was posted at the court house and published three times
in a local newspaper. 'fhe rc>eorct ,]oes not reveal any notice
of a place where offers or bids \HHdd be reeeived. (Prob.
Code, §§ 1534, 780, 782.) F'urther, there is no record that
an appraisal was made. (Pro b. Code, § 784.) The only statement of the value of the property that appears in the record
was that made by respondent in his petition. He alleged
therein that the rental value of the property was not suffieient
to pay taxes, upkeep, and the interest on the debt of $13,206.25,
seemed by the trust deed to Yasabura; that the property was
not worth more than $6,000; and that he had received an
offer in that amount. It was further alleged in the petition
that IIiroko had attained her majority "but that there will
be no money to go into the guardianship from the sale of
this property for the reason that the ::;aid property is encumbered with a trust deed in favor of Y. Kawakita . . . and that
therefore the wards have no equity whatever, and [respondent]
therefore thinks that it will be for the best interests of this
estate that the building be sold and the estate closed.'' The
petition for permission to sell was subsequently granted, and
a sale was consummated to John T. Rashid for $6,000. Sinee
the amount due on the trust deed was greater than the sale
price, the guardianship estate received nothing from the sale.
The $6,000 less the costs of the sale, were deposited in the
"blocked" bank aecount of Yasabura, pursuant to a license
issued by the United States Department of the Treasury. The
guardian's annual reports for 1943 and 1944 were approved,
but the estate was not elosed until October 2, 1946, when the
court diseharged the guardian and ordered the assets of the
estate-$329.68-distributed to the wards.
Tomoya returned to the United States in 1946. He was
thereafter in dieted for and eonvieted of treason. Judgment
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order and that therefore we have no jurisdiction to review
these contentions in this proceeding.
[1] Section 1630 of the Probate Code provides that ".An
appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from an order
granting or revoking letters of guardianship ; settling an account of a guardian ; instructing or directing a guardian; or
refusing to make any order heretofore mentioned in this
section.'' With the possible exception of an order granting
a new trial (see Estate of Armstrong, 8 Cal.2d 204, 206 [64
P.2d 1093]), it is settled that only those orders mentioned in
section 1630 are appealable in guardianship proceedings.
(Guardianship of Leach, 29 Cal.2d 535, 539 [176 P .2d 369] ;
Estate of Kay, 30 Cal.2d 215, 217 [181 P.2d 1]; see also
Kramer v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 159, 161 [222 P.2d 874] ;
Fredrickson v. Superior Coud, 38 Cal.2d 593, 596-597 [241
P .2d 541].) [2] That section does not mention an appeal
from an order either granting or denying a motion to vacate
or annul a prior order of the court. Accordingly, an appeal
may be taken from such an order only if in legal effect it is
tantamount to one or more of the orders listed. (See Lyon
v. Goss, 19 Cal.2d 659, 670 [123 P.2d 11] ; Estate of Estrern,
16 CaJ.2d 563, 566 [107 P.2d 36] .) If respondent's letters
of guardianship were still in effect it might reasonably
be contended that the court's order refusing to vacate and
annul the order appointing him guardian was tantamount to
an order refusing to revoke letters of guardianship. (See
In re Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555, 559 [222 P. 381] ; Estate of
Estrern, supra, 16 Cal.2d 563, 566; cf., Guardianship of Brazeal, 117 Cal..App.2d 59, 60 [254 P.2d 886] .) [3] In the
present case, however, respondent was discharged as guardian
approximately four years before this proceeding was commenced, and accordingly his letters are no longer in effect
and could not now be revoked by any order to vacate and
annul. Nor is the order appealed from equivalent to any of
the other orders listed in section 1630.
The appeal is dismissed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-1 dissent.
The majority has seen fit to dismiss this appeal upon the
sole ground that the order appealed from is not an appealable
order. Such a decision is not only erroneous and misleading
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but is based upon an inadequate analysis of section 1630 of
the Probate Code.
It is well recognized in California that the right of appeal
in probate matters is purely statutory and exists only in those
cases in which it is given by statute. (Estate of Funkenstein,
170 Cal. 594 [150 P. 987]; In re Walkerly, 94 Cal. 352 [29
P. 719] .) It is equally well recognized that the right to appeal
in guardianship matters is governed exclusively by Probate
Code, section 1630. (Guardianship of Leach, 29 Cal.2d 535
[176 P.2d 369] .)
In the case at bar the appellants appealed from an order
denying a motion "to vacate, annul and declare void" the
appointment of a guardian. Since such an order has to do with
guardianship proceedings it can only be appealed from if
provision for such appeal has been made by section 1630 of
the Probate Code. It therefore becomes apparent that the
appealability or nonappealability of the instant order is dependent upon the provisions of section 1630 of the Probate
Code.
Section 1630 of the Probate Code provides that ''An appeal
may be taken to the Supreme Court from an order granting
or revoking letters of guardianship; settling an account of a
guardian ; instructing or directing a guardian ; or refusing· to
make any order heretofore mentioned in this section." (Emphasis added.) This section makes it unquestionably clear
that an appeal may be taken from an order granting or revoking letters of guardianship and that an appeal may also
be taken from a refusal to make either of these orders. Thus
an order revoking letters of guardianship is an appealable
order. Likewise an order refusing to revoke letters of guardianship is also an appealable order. We therefore find that
section 1630 of the Probate Code makes express provision for
the appeal of an order refusing to revoke letters of guardianship. Not only does section 1630 expressly provide for the
appeal of orders refusing to revoke letters of g'Uardianship
but the appeal of such orders has long been the accepted practice in California. (In re Morhoff, 179 Cal. 595 l178 P. 294];
111atter of Schwartz, 171 Cal. 633 [154 P. 304]; Guardianship
of Rapp, 54 Cal.App.2d 461 [ 129 P.2d 130].) The rule in
California is well established that "An appeal may be taken
from a judgment or order of the superior court granting or
refusing to grant, revoking or refusing to revoke, letters of
guardianship; . . . " (13 Cal.Jur. 167.)
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determined that an order refusing to revoke letters
of
is an
order, we must now determine whether in the instant ease the order in question was one
whieh refused to revoke letters of guardianship. Looking
1950, we find that they
to appellants' motion oE October
sought to "vacate, annul and declare void the order of this
eourt [probate eourt] made in this proceeding, on May 5, 1942,
appointing \V. II. Lorenz [respondent] a guardian of the
estates of said Hiroko Kawakita and Tomoya Kawakita, . . . ''
This order of May 5, 1942, which appellants sought to vacate
was entitled '' r~ETTERS OF GuARDIANSHIP', anrl it provided
among other things that "\V. H. Lorenz is hereby appointed
guardian of" the estate of Hiroko and Tomoya Kawakita.
'l'his means that appellants sought to vacate the order of
May 5, 1942, by ·which letters of guardianship were granted
to respondent. 'rhe court's refusal to make such an order,
vacating the order of May 5, 1942, was clearly a refusal to
"vacate, annul and declare void" the letters of guardianship.
If an order refusing to "vacate, annul and declare void" is
the same thing as an order refusing to "revoke" then the
instant order refusing to vacate the letters of guardianship
is without question an appealable order within the provisions
of section 1630 of the Probate Code.
In comparing the word "revoke" with the word "vacate"
we find that the courts of this country have frequently held
the two terms to be synonymous (People ex rel. Filippone v.
Martin, 46 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235). As for comparing the word
"revoke" with the word "annul" we find that to revoke is "to
annul by recalling or taking back; . . . An annulling; a cancellation . . . . " ·webster's New International Dictionary,
second ed., 1933, unabridged.) In Black's Law Dietionary
(third eel, 1933) it is stated that "revoke" means "To call
back; to recall; to annul an act by calling or taking it back.''
The courts of this country have been in accord ·with such definitions. (Bmun Estate, 358 Pa. 271 [56 A.2d 201]; Mayor,
etc., of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co., 83 Tex. 548 [19
S.W. 127]; ]i'orcl v. Greenawalt, 292 Ill. 121 [126 N.E. 555] .)
It is equally well established that the word "revoke" means
to "declare void." (O'Hagen v. Kracke, 165 Misc. 4 [300
N.Y.S. 351, 362] ; In re Will of Barrie, 393 Il1. 111 [65 N.E.2d
433] ; Commissioner af Internal ReventLe v. Holmes' Estate,
148 F .2d 740, 742.) In California our courts have frequently
used such terms as ''revoke,'' ''vacate'' and ''set aside'' interchangeably. (Gtlarcliansh1:p of Van Loan, 142 Cal. 423 ['76 P.
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37); In re Morhoff, st£pra, 179 Cal. 595; Estate of Eikerenkotter, 126 Cal. 54 [58 P. 370J; In re Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555
[222 P. 381].) It thus becomes apparent that a motion to
''vacate, annul and declare void'' is the equivalent of a
motion to ''revoke.''
In the case at bar the appellants sought to "vacate, annul
and declare void'' the letters of guardianship of respondent.
This was in effect a motion to revoke such letters. 'l'he order
of the probate court refusing to revoke such letters of guardianship was clearly and unequivocally an appealable order
within the provisions of section 1630 of the Probate Code.
The net result is that the order appealed from is an appealable order and it is incumbent upon this court to decide the
case upon its merits. The mere fact that the guardian was
previously discharged is immaterial since the order to revoke
and vacate because of an absence of jurisdiction does more
tban merely discharge a guardian, it goes back and cancels
all proceedings based upon such appointment. It is well
established that an order of the court which, as here, is void
on its face can be set aside at any time. (In re Dahnke,
s1tpra, 64 Cal.App. 555; People v. Greene, 74 Cal. 400 [16 P.
197, 5 Am.St.Rep. 448]; Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal.2d 563
r107 P.2d 36].)
In the case at bar the lower court committed a patent and
obvious error in refusing to revoke the letters of guardianship since the record of the order of appointment was void
on its face. The valid appointment of a guardian for a minor
requires that notice of the appointment proceedings be given
to the parents of the minor, or alternatively, proof must be
made that such notice cannot be given. It is also requisite
that the appointment be "necessary or convenient." (Prob.
Code, §§ 1440, 1441.) In the instant case no notice was given
to the parents of Hiroko and Tomoya and an appointment
made without such notice is a nullity. (In re Dahnke, St(pra, 64
Cal.App. 555; Guardianship of Kerns, 74 Cal.App.2d 862
[169 P.2d 975] ; Guardianship of Van Loan, s~lpra, 142 Cal.
423.) The record also indicates that the appointment was
nrither necessary nor convenient since at the time the letters
of guardianship were issued the record before the court
showed that the property of the estate was worth less than
$6,000; that liabilities amounted to more than $13,000; and
that therefore Hiroko and Tomoya had "no equity whatever"
in the property which was to constitute the guardianship
estate. The law in California is well established that an order
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appointing a guardian of the person and estate of a minor may
be vacated at any time, if the record of the appointment discloses affirmatively upon its face that the order was void
for want of jurisdiction of the court to make it. (Estate of
Eikerenkotter, sttpra, 126 Cal. 54.) It thus becomes apparent
that the order which appellants sought to revoke was a nullity
and should have been set aside.
For these reasons I would reverse the order appealed from
with directions to enter an order setting aside the order appointing respondent guardian of these petitioners and all
subsequent orders based thereon.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 23,
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

[L. A. No. 22493.

In Bank.

May 28, 1954.]

HIROKO KAWAKITA HAYASHI et al., Appellants, v.
W. H. lJORENZ et al., Respondents.
[1] Dismissal-Failure to Prosecute-Discretion of Court.-"Discretion" within Code Civ. Proc., § 583, authorizing court in
its discretion to dismiss action for want of prosecution, is
discretion of trial court, and it will be disturbed only in cases
of manifest abuse.
[2] Judgments-Opening and Vacating-Time for Application for
Relief.-A judgment or order which is void on its face, and
which requires only an inspection of judgment roll or record
to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion at any time
after its entry by court which rendered the judgment or made
the order.
[3] Dismissal-Failure to Prosecute-Excuse for Delay.-Where
validity of orders in guardianship proceedings can be attacked
at any time, proceedings instituted by wards' motions to
vacate orders in guardianship matter provide no excuse for
[1] See Cal.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 20;
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, §57.
[2] Lapse of time as bar to action or proceeding for relief in
respect of void judgment, note, 154 A.L.R. 818. See, also, Cal.Jur.,
Judgments, § 111; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 727 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal,§§ 38, 40; [2] Judgments,
§ 189; [ 3, 8] Dismissal, § 45; [4] Prisons and Prisoners, § 19;
[5-7] Prisons and Prisoners, § 20; [9] Dismissal, §59.

